
Michael Collins led the IRA intelligence operation on the morning of Bloody Sunday
On the morning of Sunday the 21st of November 1920, during the Irish War of Independence, an intelligence-led operation was carried out in Dublin by the IRA, under the direction of Michael Collins, which led to the deaths of fourteen people believed to be British intelligence agents. Later that day, members of the Royal Irish Constabulary opened fire on a crowd of civilians watching a match between Tipperary and Dublin in Croke Park. Fourteen people died. Later that evening, three republican prisoners were beaten to death in Dublin Castle. Not surprisingly, Sunday the 21st of November 1920 became known as Bloody Sunday (not to be confused with the Bogside Massacre that took place in Derry on the 30th of January 1972). Among Irish nationalists, Bloody Sunday is widely remembered for its brutality.
Amid all the talk of the Queen’s historic visit to Croke Park, it is not surprising that the anti-nationalist historical revisionists are out in full force trying, as they will, to rewrite Irish history in a way that fits their own brand of anti-Irishness. Among them, not surprisingly, is Kevin Myers. In a recent Irish Independent article he claims that the events of Bloody Sunday now “exist largely in a realm of legend, which states that the British secret service was crippled in one brilliantly organised stroke, and so the cruel British army got its revenge with a massacre of the innocents of Croke Park.” He further asserts that that “the general Irish account for Bloody Sunday is that some 14 British secret agents got their thoroughly deserved come-uppance that morning, and that British soldiers later murdered 14 unarmed people in Croke Park in revenge.” While Myers disagrees, citing some book that he puts a great deal of faith in because it supports his narrative, I, however, think that is a pretty accurate summation of the events of Bloody Sunday.

A ticket to that fateful match in Croke Park
To strengthen his argument that the events of Bloody Sunday now remain “in a realm of legend”, Myers points out three things (1) that British “soldiers shot no one in Croke Park – policemen did”, (2) those that opened fire in Croke Park were simply “out of control. They were not following orders, nor were they implementing policy of any kind” and (3) that somehow, there is some sort of macabre but just symmetry between the shootings carried out by the IRA and those carried out by the men in Croke Park. This latter point, however, in merely implied, it is not explicitly stated.
First of all, Myers is only telling a half truth when he suggests that the killings in Croke Park were committed by policemen and not soldiers. The men who carried out the Croke Park massacre were made up of both members of the Royal Irish Constabulary (the then Irish police force) and, to the best of my knowledge, members of the Royal Irish Constabulary’s Auxiliary Division (the military wing of the RIC). Most of the shooting, however, was done by the ordinary members of the RIC (the police force) but this was under the direction of its military wing (commanded by Major Mills). Thus, both the ordinary and military wings of the RIC were involved. To call these men Policemen is only telling half the story. Of course, all this took place in the context of the War of Independence and it does not take a great leap of faith to consider the RIC as “British soldiers”. Ok, they weren’t British soldiers in the true sense of the term but they were an armed police force with a military wing. The RIC, at least during the War of Independence, had a military structure and it operated under the direction of the British government. The RIC was armed, it had a military structure and it took its orders from the British. At least in that sense, they could be considered “British soldiers” (as they would have been viewed, arguably, by the majority of Irish people at that time). It is for that reason that “military courts of inquiry” investigated the events in Croke Park. Even if you did accept Myers’ contention that those who carried out the Killings were policemen and not soldiers, that does not excuse anything. In fact, it probably makes the events more sickening.
Secondly, Myers is also only telling a half truth when he suggests that those who opened fire in Croke Park were simply “out of control. They were not following orders, nor were they implementing policy of any kind” Of course, it must be remembered that the decision to carry out the Croke Park massacre was taken at a local level by individual RIC members and not by the British government itself or by very senior British military figures. However, the command to carry out the massacre was given by a member of the British forces with at least some degree of authority, a Major. In any army, a Major is a senior figure and it could be said that he would have had the power to give “official orders”.
Thirdly, Myers seems to implicitly suggest that the shootings in Croke Park were a fair reprisal for the earlier IRA killing of British and Irish personnel. These men were, as Myers points out, mostly British intelligence officers while some were completely innocent. What is clear, though, is that those shot in Croke Park were civilians but most of those shot by the IRA could be considered as legitimate military targets since they were operatives for the occupying British forces (at least in the eyes of the vast majority of the Irish people). The IRA were engaged in a legitimate military struggle and, with all wars, there are usually innocent causalities. In this case, the innocent causalities were killed as the result of poor intelligence. That, of course, should never have happened. It must be noted, however, that there is a gaping disparity, whether Myers wants to admit it or not, between shooting a group of fourteen people comprised of legitimate military targets and a number of innocent people wrongly singled out due to poor intelligence and shooting fourteen innocent civilians at a football match.
Of course, this is a view that will never be accepted by Myers and his anti-nationalist ilk. As Myers suggests, “before one is entitled to have a strong opinion on historical matters, one must at least learn them”. Perhaps he should practice what he preaches.